Corruption in Brazil: evidence from a new conviction dataset

Nicole Janz, Dalson Figueiredo & Caio Malaquias





Fostering Transparency in Government Institutions and Higher Education: A Research and Teaching Initiative

Catalysts: Dalson Figueiredo (Federal University of Pernambuco) and Nicole Janz (University of Nottingham)

Locations: University of Nottingham, UK; Recife, Brazil; Brasilia, Brazil

We find research findings resulting from data that is not publicly accessible to not be credible. Similarly, governments withholding administrative information should not be trusted. We argue that the lack of government and research transparency are connected, and can be tackled in by offering training on reproducibility. This project aims to foster transparency in scholarly research and in government institutions. In particular, we will conduct educational workshops that will leverage insights that have been used to increase governmental and research transparency in the UK to improve transparency in Brazil. Our target groups are 100 undergraduate and graduate students, 20 scholars, and 20 bureaucrats. The project will strengthen research skills and transparency norms that can contribute to scientific innovation, development, and social welfare. The first workshop will be part of a day-long conference: "The Gold Standard of Reproducible Research" at the University of Nottingham on March 9, 2017.

See the workshop's OSF page here.





PRODUCTS

Fostering data transparency in Brazil



Funder: Newton Fund UK host: Dr Nicole Janz Duration: September 2016 - November 2018

This project aims to encourage government and research community in Brazil to make data sources n available in an attempt to improve government practices and scholarly research.

Brazil currently faces the challenges of its government lacking transparency in the dissemination of a data, particularly on corruption. Similarly, the majority of Brazilian social scientists do not provide acc In this project Dr Nicole Janz and her colleague Dr Dalson Figueiredo from Federal University of Perna Recife, Brazil, will:

- conduct a novel study on corruption in Brazil and to make data publicly accessible
- conduct transparency workshops for researchers and civil servants

The project will strengthen research skills and transparency norms that can contribute to innovation, and ultimately social welfare.

This research is funded through a Newton Fund Mobility grant ref: NG106153.





UNITED KINCDOM - CHINA - MALAYSIA

Research, Enterprise and Graduate Services University of Nottingham King's Meadow Campus Lenton Lane Nottingham NG7 2NR

Director, Research Services Office

Dear Sir/Madam

FOSTERING TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A RESEARCH AND TRAINING INITIATIVE

BRITISH ACADEMY NEWTON MOBILITY GRANT/ NG160153

The British Academy ("Funding Body") has awarded the above titled grant attached as Annex 1 to Dr Dalson Figueiredo at the Federal University of Pernambuco ("the Award Holder"). The co-investigator is Dr Nicole Janz at the University of Nottingham("the UK Host Organisation"). The parties to this letter agreement are referred to as "Collaborators", or a "Collaborator" as the case may be.



but also, how the government can

The main argument of our project was that transparency is a fundamental basis of credibility, trust and legitimacy. With its prominent corruption cases in the business and political world, and a largescale criminal investigation Operation Car Wash. Brazil continues to face such challenges: (1) Its government lacks transparency in the dissemination of aggregate data, particularly on corruption; (2) the majority of Brazilian social science research does not provide access to replication data.

Since civil servants are educated in social science Departments in universities, we believed that government and research lack of transparency are connected. Transferring insights on open data initiatives from the UK to Brazil, we aimed at fostering transparency in scholarly research and in

Seven Reasons to Work Reproducibly

August 6th, 2019, Dalson Figueiredo, Nicole Janz

Posted in: Reproducibility, open science initiatives, Brazil, transparent workflow



a guest post from Dalson Figueiredo and Nicole Ianz who helped to co-author Seven Reasons ide to Transparency and Reproducibility, the first guide of its kind outlining reproducibility best ernment institutions and the political science community in Brazil.

& Workshops Y TIER in the Classroom Y Events

TIER Network

TIER Protocol V

ence

foreign direct investment, corruption iber of initiatives to promote research ottingham. Nicole taught statistics for ch Methods Centre, University of the Department of Politics and icole created and directed the imbassador at the Center for Open nitiative for Transparency in the Social r blog about reproducibility, and on

ntation in January at the 2019 Open many. Nicole's presentation, co-authored

with Jeremy Freese (Stanford University) and entitled "Good and Bad Replications in Political Science: How Replicators and Original Authors (Should) Talk to Each Other." provides insights into how individuals should manage the process of performing and reporting on replications. Video of the presentation is available on YouTube. The slides and paper are also available on the OSSC2019 web site.

Nicole and colleagues Dalson Figueiredo (Federal University of Pernambuco and 2016-17 TIER Fellow) and Rodrigo Lins (past TIER workshop attendee) have a forthcoming paper in the Brazilian Journal of Political Science entitled, "Seven Reasons



Twitter Handle @polscireplicate

OUTLINE


MEASURING CORRUPTION


DATA & METHODS

RESULTS

CONCLUSIONS

(n = 746, 1909 - 2021)










Source (year)	Measurement
Ades & Di Tella. (1999)	Business Intelligence corruption index
Alt & Lassen (2014)	Corruption convictions in the United States, as reported by the Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice
Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna & Mullainathan (2007)	difference between the proportion of subjects in the 'bonus for fast receipt of driver's license' treatment and those in the lesson and control conditions who receive their license, how quickly they receive it, whether they take the licensing exam, whether paid above official fees, whether they tried to bribe, whether used an agent, etc.
Golden & Picci (2005)	the difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and the cumulative price government pays for public capital stocks. Where the difference is larger between the monies spent and the existing physical infrastructure, more money is being siphoned off to mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement; that is, corruption is greater
Transparency International	Corruption Perceptions Index. The index, which ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.
Chong, De La O, Karlan & Wantchekon. (2012)	percentage of resources mayors spent in a corrupt manner (in other words, spending where some form of irregularity was identified such as over-invoicing, fake receipts, diverting resources, fraud, etc.)
Figueiredo, Miguel, Hidalgo & Kasahara. (2012)	Convictions for impropriety while in government office
Ferraz & Finan (2008)	Each audit report contains the total amount of federal funds transferred to the current administration and the amount audited, as well as an itemized list describing each irregularity. Based on our readings of the reports, we codified the irregularities listed into those associated with corruption and those that simply represent poor administration?
Fisman & Miguel (2007)	Accumulation of unpaid parking violations by diplomats in Manhattan
Glaeser & Saks (2006)	The number of government officials convicted for corrupt practices through the Federal justice department/the number of Federal corruption convictions per capita by state
Olken (2007)	The difference between official project cost (of building roads) and independent engineers' estimate of costs

Measurement types







https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/spotlights-corruption.php



American Political Science Review

Article contents

Incerti supplementary material

PDF 656 KB

Abstract

Footnotes

References






Figure A.2: Field experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share (excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))





Figure A.3: Survey experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share (including De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara (2011))



https://osf.io/7exsq/

Fostering Transparency in Government ...

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Fostering Transparency in Government Institutions and Higher Education: A Research and Teaching Initiative

Contributors: Dalson Britto Figueiredo Filho, Nicole Janz, Lucas Silva, Caio Malaquias

Date created: 2018-01-08 01:26 AM | Last Updated: 2018-06-28 07:52 PM

Category: Project

Description: This data collection, designed to facilitate analysis of corruption and judicial slowness, contains disaggregated information on 65,464 Brazilian court cases from 1992 to 2018. The variables are clustered according to five dimensions: sentence, conviction, social, justice administration and criminal (see codebook).

License: Add a license

Pesquisar

The Primary Source

http://www.cnj.jus.br/improbidade adm/consultar requerido.php

Cadastro Nacional de Condenações Cíveis por Ato de Improbidade Administrativa e Inelegibilidade

↑ Conselho Nacional de Justiça - CNJ



The Primary Source

Nome Pessoa	Núm. Processo
ANTONIO CARLOS BOUZADA	0521980018506
ANTONIO CARLOS BOUZADA	19980510014743
INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE ESTUDOS E PESQUISAS COMUNITARIAS DE SÃO PAULO	00155991220084036100
INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE ESTUDOS E PESQUISAS COMUNITARIAS DE SÃO PAULO	19980510014743
LAUTON MACHADO RIBEIRO DA SILVA FILHO	08043275620118120002
'IDELMA LUCIANA DA SILVA NUNES	19980510014743
): ANA PAULA FERREIRA DOS SANTOS	00041624920168160101
): CARLOS ALBERTO DE MELO	00059728120068160013
Número de registros: 69925	Página 1 de 4662 🕞 📵

The Problem

De: Dalson [mailto:dalsonbritto@yahoo.com.br]

Enviada em: quinta-feira, 19 de novembro de 2015 22:11

Para: Seção de Atendimento ao Usuário - Sistemas Nacionais CNJ <sistemasnacionais@cnj.jus.br>

Assunto: Solicitação de Banco de Dados

Prezados, "Please, could you share the data?"

Meu nome é Dalson Figueiredo e sou professor de Ciência Política na Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. Estou coordenando uma pesquisa sobre improbidade administrativa no Brasil e gostaria de solicitar acesso ao banco de dados utilizado para alimentar o Cadastro Nacional de Condenações Cíveis por Ato de Improbidade Administrativa e Inelegibilidade, organizado pelo CNJ. Em particular, gostaria de receber as informações em algum formato de planilha de trabalho (.xls, .sav, .dta).

Atenciosamente,

Dalson Britto Figueiredo Filho, Dr.

Assistant Professor of Political Science

Federal University of Pernambuco - UFPE (Recife - Brazil)

CV online: http://lattes.cnpq.br/6683806605359913

The Problem

On Friday, November 20, 2015, 12:06 PM, Seção de Atendimento ao Usuário - Sistemas Nacionais CNJ <sistemasnacionais@cnj.jus.br> wrote:

Prezado Senhor Dalson,

Informamos que o acesso e restritos apenas para servidores dos tribunais do âmbito do Poder Judiciário para realizar o acesso ao sistema do CNJ.

Colocamo-nos à disposição para maiores informações ou esclarecimentos de dúvidas.

Atenciosamente,

Equipe da Seção de Gestão de Atendimento ao Usuário – SEGAU Coordenadoria de Atendimento e Infraestrutura – COAI Departamento de Tecnologia da Informação – DTI CNJ - Conselho Nacional de Justiça.

Telefone: (61) 2326-5353.

E-mail: <u>sistemasnacionais@cnj.jus.br</u>

"Sorry, the data is restricted to justice staff!"



The Plan





The Code

```
library(magrittr)
library(dplyr)
library(stringr)
library(data.table)
#Library(cnc)
setwd("C:/Users/Caio/Dropbox/Fostering Transparency - SandBox/01 - Original
Data")
source("parse-cnc.R")
source("improbos.R")
# pronto
# coleta feita dia 30 de junho de 2018
cnc pags(path = 'data-raw/pags', pags = 1:1)
d_pags <- 'data-raw/pags' %>%
  dir(full.names = TRUE) %>%
  parse pags()
```





The Data

- Sample size: 65,464 court cases judged in Brazil by all justice levels
 - 18,860 corruption-related cases
- Time frame: 1992 to 2018
- Level of analysis: disaggregated information by justice courts by city (municipal level)
- Number of variables: +50 (time to judge, gender, type of punishment, etc.)
- Crime type: we collected the specific crime committed by each defendant

The Data

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cci_brazil_states.csv	
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ccUsaBrazil-mostBrazil.htm	
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mt_codebook.xlsx	


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Category	Name	Туре	Format	Description	Source	Link
lawsuit	lawsuit_number	Number	1 - 99999999999	CNJ lawsuit number	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	lawsuit_id	Number	1 - 99999999999	CNJ system lawsuit URL ide	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	lawsuit_link	String	Aa-Zz	Lawsuit sequential number	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	initial_date	Date	dd-MMM-YY	Date when the lawsuit starte	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
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lawsuit	initial_year	Number	1992-2018	Initial year when the lawsuit	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	final_date	Date	dd-MMM-YY	Date when the lawsuit was j	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	final_day	Number	1 – 31	Final day when the lawsuit	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	final_month	Number	1 – 12	Final month when the lawsu	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	final_year	Number	1992-2018	Final year when the lawsuit	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	input_date	Date	dd-MMM-YY	The date when the lawsuit	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
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lawsuit	time_judge_months	Number	0,00 - 9999999,00	Time do judge (months)	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
lawsuit	time_judge_years	Number	0,00 - 9999999,00	Time do judge (years)	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
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lawsuit	court_short	String	Aa-Zz	Judicial court abbreviation	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro
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lawsuit	region	String	Aa-Zz	Geographic region (North, N	Cadastro Nacional de Impro	https://www.cnj.jus.br/impro

The Data


Table 1 – Types of Corruption

Definition	Measurement	Source
Narrow Corruption	Active and passive corruption	Brazilian Criminal Code, Capasso and Santoro (2018) Langseth (2006)
Public Corruption	All crimes committed by public officials against public administration	Brazilian Criminal Code
Private Corruption	All crimes committed by private actors ²⁷ against public administration	Brazilian Criminal Code
Administrative Corruption	All administrative malpractices that generate illicit enrichment (art. 9), losses to the public treasury (art. 10) or that violates the principles of public administration (art. 11)	Administrative Malpractice Act - Brazilian Law 8.429/1992 Ferraz and Finan (2008)

Note: Crimes listed in the Brazilian Criminal Code are subject to three types of penalties: incarceration, rights restriction and fines. Offenses enumerated in the Administrative Malpractice Act only lead to civil charges against the defendants (there is no incarceration). The possible penalties are: loss of property, full refund of misappropriated resources, dismissal from public office, political rights suspension, fines and prohibition of contracting with government agencies.




Time to judge N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases




Source: CNJ

Source: CNJ




Definition	N (%)	Source
Narrow Corruption Public Corruption	253 (1.34) 737 (3.9)	Brazilian Criminal Code
Private Corruption	627 (3.32)	
Administrative Corruption	17,519 (92.89)	Administrative Malpractice Act - Brazilian Law 8.429/1992

Corruption Convictions in Brazil (1992 - 2018)




Note: Total number of corruption-related conviction cases in Brazil according to our four corruption types classification.

Time to judge - N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases





Time to judge - N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases




Time to judge by convicted type
N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases (1992-2018)

 $\log_{e}(\mathrm{BF_{01}})$ = -52.11, $\widehat{\delta}_{\mathrm{difference}}^{\mathrm{posterior}}$ = -1.09, $\mathrm{CI}_{95\%}^{\mathrm{HDI}}$ [-1.29, -0.88], $r_{\mathrm{Cauchy}}^{\mathrm{JZS}}$ = 0.71






Time to judge - N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases



Time to judge by gender
N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases (1992-2018)

= 2.62, $\hat{\delta}_{\text{difference}}^{\text{posterior}}$ = 0.12, Cl_{95%} [-0.04, 0.27], $r_{\text{Cauchy}}^{\text{JZS}}$ = 0.71



Number of cases at time t


Female -	2353 13414	1306 7906	325 1951	65 287	6 24	0
S C	Ö	5	10	15	20	25

Yes

955

Time to judge by incarceration punishment N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases (1992-2018)

195



17

10

0


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Time do judge by incarceration punishment

N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases (1992-2018)

25


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
Number of administrative corruption cases over time

N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases




Time to judge over time

N = 18,860 corruption-related court cases




Correlation between time to judge and corruption rate data aggregated by state




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RESULTS



INCENTIVOS DA DINÂMICA POLÍTICA SOBRE A CORRUPÇÃO

Gráfico 5 Corrupção e Má Gestão nos Municípios Brasileiros



Fonte: Elaboração própria.

CONCLUSIONS


- Corruption-related cases take longer to be judged in Brazil (6.34 x 3.48 years)
- There is a significant spatial variation on the time to judge corruption-related cases
- Most corruption cases are administrative misconducts (mismanagement) (93%)
- Military justice is the quickest, state justice is the slowest
- Court cases with corporations defendants live longer
- There is no significant effect of gender on the time to judge corruption-related cases
- Court cases with incarceration penalties are judged faster
- The number of corruption convictions is increasing over time
- Average time to judge a corruption-related cases is decreasing over time

LIMITATIONS

Data gathering problems

Only convictions





Law enforcement differences

Measurement error

Missing data

FUNDING

- The British Academy
- Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences

How the bloody hell do you define corruption?!



A workshop for research students and early-career researchers

King's College London, 19 Oct 2018

Olli Hellmann

DEFINING CORRUPTION

SOURCE (YEAR)	DEFINITION	
Brooks (1909)	the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal	
World Bank Rose- Ackerman (1975) Jain (2001)	Abuse of public office for private gain	
Transparency International	Abuse of entrusted power for private gain	
World Bank	'corrupt' practice as the 'offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party.'	
Shleifer & Vishny (1993)	we define government corruption as the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain	
Treisman (2000)	the misuse of public office for private gain	
Andersson & Heywood (2009)	the misuse of power in the interests of illicit gain	

WHY BRAZIL?

"From the day Mr. Costa became a whistle-blower in 2014 to February 2016, the Federal Prosecution Service brought 37 criminal charges against 179 people. The charges amount to a total of 6.4 billion BRL (around 2.6 billion USD in 2012 dollar value) in bribes paid from 2003-2012" (Figueiredo, 2016)


https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/Car%20Wash%20PSA%20final1_0.pdf


Brazil corruption scandals: All you need to know





WHY BRAZIL?





Brasil piora duas posições em ranking de corrupção

Entre 180 países analisados, o Brasil ocupou a 96ª colocação no Índice de Percepção da Corrupção (IPC) no ano passado, segundo levantamento da Transparência Internacional.

Por g125/01/2022 02h01 · Atualizado há 5 horas

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Confidence in the National Congress Latin America (2018)

